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The participatory turn in radioactive waste management: Deliberation 
and the social-technical divide 
National policies for long-term management of radioactive waste have for 
decades been driven by technical experts. The pursuit of these technocratic 
policies led in many countries to conflict with affected communities. Since the 
late 1990s, however, there has been a turn to more participatory approaches. This 
participatory turn reflects widespread acknowledgement in the discourse of 
policy actors and implementing organisations of the importance of social aspects 
of radioactive waste management and the need to involve citizens and their 
representatives in the process. This appears to be an important move towards 
democratisation of this particular field of technological decision making but, 
despite these developments, technical aspects are still most often brought into the 
public arena only after technical experts have defined the ‘problem’ and decided 
upon a ‘solution’. This maintains a notional divide between the treatment of 
technical and social aspects of radioactive waste management and raises pressing 
questions about the kind of choice affected communities are given if they are not 
able to debate fully the technical options. The article aims to contribute to better 
understanding and addressing this situation by exploring the complex 
entanglement of the social and the technical in radioactive waste management 
policy and practice, analysing the contingent configurations that emerge as 
sociotechnical combinations. Drawing upon empirical examples from four 
countries that have taken the participatory turn - Belgium, Slovenia, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom – the article describes the different ways in which 
sociotechnical combinations have been constructed, and discusses their 
implications for future practice. 
Keywords: public participation; sociotechnical combinations; radioactive waste 
management; Belgium; Slovenia; Sweden; United Kingdom 
Introduction 
The aim of this article is to examine critically the burgeoning practice of stakeholder 
engagement in radioactive waste management (RWM). This apparent turn away from 
technocratic decision making calls for closer scrutiny. In particular we focus on the way 
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in which the relationship between the technical and the social strands of RWM is 
constructed in different contexts, and explore the consequences of these different 
configurations. To do so, we examine developments in Belgium, Slovenia, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom, drawing on the findings and collected data of two collaborative 
research projects.1 Both projects employed qualitative research methods, and gathered 
data through document analysis, interviews with concerned actors and key players, and 
group discussions between engaged participants from different countries that took place 
during several workshops held over the course of the projects. 
Since the early 1970s efforts to investigate potential sites for the final disposal of 
radioactive waste have in most Western countries encountered strong local opposition; 
opposition that in many cases continues to this day. By the mid-1990s, mishandling of 
the nuclear waste problem and in particular of national repository siting programmes 
had resulted in an impasse in many countries. This was particularly the case for high-
level waste (HLW) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF), with notable examples including the 
lasting controversies around the Yucca Mountain repository project in the USA and the 
Gorleben project in Germany (Strandberg and Andrén 2011). The picture for low and 
intermediate level waste (LILW), for which many countries had operational repositories 
by the end of the 20th century, has also been problematic as siting new facilities has also 
been controversial in countries such as Belgium and Slovenia, which only started their 
                                                 
1 CARL (2004-2007) was a comparative social sciences research project co-sponsored by the 
national RWM agencies of the participating countries and by regulators and two concerned 
municipalities from Sweden, and involving citizen stakeholder groups from all four 
countries (Bergmans et al. 2008). InSOTEC (2011-2014) was a collaborative social 
sciences research project funded by European Atomic Energy Community's 7th 
Framework Programme FP7/2007-2011 under grant agreement n°2699009 (see 
www.insotec.eu). 
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siting efforts at the beginning of the 1990s (Bergmans 2008; Kos, Polič and Železnik 
2011).  
This resistance has very often been regarded by waste managers, nuclear 
proponents and policy makers as a ‘NIMBY’ (Not In My Back Yard) reaction, with all 
of the attendant negative value judgements. However, as many researchers have now 
pointed out, such responses should not be interpreted simply as expressing selfish self-
interest or irrational fear arising from ignorance, but that people often have good 
reasons for not wanting to live in the vicinity of a radioactive waste repository (Kemp 
1990; Lidskog and Elander 1992). Negative responses in potential host communities 
have been linked to responsible agencies’ neglect of the ‘social aspects’ of the waste 
problem, but also to differences in views on the need for and importance of the 
proposed disposal technology (Bergmans et al. 2008). Controversy has led in several 
countries, notable among them Sweden and Belgium, to a participatory turn in RWM 
strategy, one that other nations facing similar problems have subsequently sought to 
emulate (Elam and Sundqvist 2007, 2009). 
But what is meant by this participatory turn?  Our starting point is that public 
participation processes in relation to controversial technology in general and RWM in 
particular are not well understood, either in practice or in social science research. On the 
one hand, participation is often understood as something good in itself, without 
discussing what participation should be about (Irwin 2006; Jasanoff 2003; Marres 
2007). On the other hand it is often viewed as a strategy for political manipulation and 
the exercise of power (Durant and Fuji Johnson 2009); for example, it has been argued 
that the participatory turn in RWM has merely been about moving the debate away from 
the national political arena in order to single out potential host communities and 
cultivate highly localised support for a putative solution to a problem with national and 
 Final pre-proof version - to be published in Journal of Risk Research 
DOI: 10.1080/13669877.2014.971335 
5
even international dimensions (Hunold 2002; Blowers and Sundqvist 2010).  In this 
article, however, beginning from a position informed by actor-network theory, which 
takes a symmetrical approach to the associations between human and material elements 
that make up the world, we suggest that the participatory turn can also be about coming 
to recognise the entanglement between the dimensions of the problem presented as 
being distinctively technical or social, and about searching for ways of addressing this 
(Barthe 2009). Rip, conceptualising entanglement as ‘associations that last longer than 
the interactions that formed them’ (after Callon and Latour 1981, 283), elaborates by 
noting how the dynamics of such interactions ‘get entangled so that patterns (in 
processes) and “structures” emerge [which] then enable and constrain further actions 
and interactions’ (Rip 2010, 381, emphasis in the original). Importantly he also observes 
that although the entanglements that emerge are a very contingent outcome of these 
interactions, the resulting patterns and structures can assume a long-term stability that 
becomes taken-for-granted and resistant to change; furthermore, he argues, despite the 
interdependencies which are formed, such long-term configurations can be 
characterised by conflict as much as by cooperation or consensus. The participatory turn 
may be seen as being an attempt to reconfigure just such antagonistically entangled 
associations between citizens, agencies and radioactive waste. However, as we shall see, 
the new configurations that are in turn produced are not without their problems.  
In what follows we argue, therefore, that wider participation in RWM should be 
not only about addressing social aspects – such as public information, trust and 
acceptance – but also about how social aspects are connected to technical aspects in 
what we call sociotechnical combinations. As Rip’s description of the dynamic nature 
of entanglement suggests, despite all being associated with RWM, such combinations 
may assume a variety of configurations; examples of these are explored by examining 
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developments in the four countries, and the consequences of each particular 
combination are critically assessed.  
First of all, however, in the next section we set the participatory turn in RWM in 
context with reference to research on participation processes in general, and continue in 
the third section with some theoretically-informed ideas on sociotechnical 
combinations. In the fourth section we present examples of how the participatory turn 
has been configured in the four nations included in our study, and in the following fifth 
section we analyse issues raised by these different sociotechnical combinations. The 
sixth and final section offers brief conclusions about the implications and prospects of 
our approach.  
The participatory turn 
Over the last decade of the 20th century, a change could be observed in framing the 
radioactive waste problem, from a technical problem, investigating possible solutions, 
to a controversial social problem in need of acceptance and legitimacy.2 This seems to 
have led to a change in policy arrangements for regulating, planning and implementing 
RWM. Particularly with regard to siting repository facilities, we have witnessed across 
the European Union (EU) a shift from a purely technical approach to one that includes 
stakeholders and the public in the decision making process and aims to integrate, to a 
bigger or lesser extent, the technical with the social. These initiatives must be seen as 
responses to public criticism of existing top-down approaches and what could be called 
                                                 
2 This change took place in parallel to international moves to reframe and rehabilitate nuclear 
energy by recontextualising it as (part of) the solution to the treats of climate change and 
energy insecurity (Bickerstaff et al. 2008). 
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the technocratic failure of RWM. New siting programmes have been set up and 
involvement of at least concerned local citizens is an important part of these initiatives 
(Landström and Bergmans 2012). 
 
Three main benefits have for a long time been associated with widening 
participation in decision making on controversial risk issues: (a) increased legitimacy of 
decision outcomes; (b) better decisions as a result of enhancing the knowledge base; (c) 
the securing of democratic values and creation of ‘true democratic citizenship’ – instead 
of alienating concerned publics from decision making that affects them in their daily 
lives (Fiorino 1990; Renn, Webler and Wiedemann 1995; Stern and Fineberg 1996). It 
has furthermore been argued that participation could contribute to a reduction of 
vulnerability to risk by enhancing citizens’ competences for dealing with technological, 
organizational, cultural, societal and other components of risks (Pearce 2005; O’Brien 
2000).  
Many researchers studying citizen and stakeholder participation have tended to 
focus on the fairness and effectiveness of the process, asking, for example, who has 
access and how the relationships of the actors are shaped by power and trust. More 
recent studies have shifted the focus of attention to ask what participation is about 
(Irwin 2006). This can be traced through empirical studies addressing issues such as: 
why do we need this technology, how could it be modified, who will pay the costs, and 
how are risks distributed? (Jasanoff 2003; Stirling 2005; Wynne 2003)  
This shift in focus is important since engagement then becomes not only about 
possibilities to participate, but also about determining which issues to deliberate upon 
(Marres 2007; Sundqvist and Elam 2010). Careful scrutiny of the framing of the 
problem, including the technology itself – what it is, the public meaning of it, and what 
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risks are involved – therefore becomes fundamental to any analysis of participatory 
processes. Rather than simply greeting developments involving greater participation as 
examples of ‘good practice’, therefore, we need to examine carefully how issues are 
framed and identified by the actors involved, and what connections between the social 
and technological aspects of the problem are deliberated upon. We therefore agree that 
there is need for more sceptical and critical examination of the ‘new’ mode of 
governance, rather than a naïve defence of the participatory turn (Cooke and Kothari 
2001; Irwin 2006; Collins and Evans 2007, Kaiser 2012), a stance which is endorsed by 
reports of disillusionment with participation and the emergence of ‘participation 
fatigue’ in some of the cases analysed here (e.g. Polič, Kos, and Železnick 2006).  
In this paper, we will therefore examine more closely what exactly is taking 
place within these new configurations in RWM, not merely in terms of the social 
processes of participation and decision making, but also crucially in terms of how these 
processes mediate the relationship between the social and technical aspects of the 
problem. While a participatory turn in RWM would appear to be making steady 
progress, and recognition of the importance of social aspects of RWM in the EU is 
practically universal (see e.g. NEA 2010), one cannot but notice that the long-standing 
consensus within the international community of nuclear experts on geological isolation 
being the best available technique and the only solution that can be envisaged for 
disposing of any type of high-level and long-lived waste has survived the change of 
management procedures. Various authors have therefore argued that many of these 
participatory initiatives are mainly driven by a need to secure legitimacy and increase 
acceptance for already technologically agreed solutions (Durant and Fuji Johnson 2009; 
Blowers and Sundqvist 2010).  
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In order to take the next step we therefore need to present some ideas on how to 
understand sociotechnical combinations. 
Sociotechnical combinations: separation and integration 
Governing any technology, particularly controversial technology such as nuclear power, 
is a task that is simultaneously technical and social. While often presented as purely 
technical, in these processes we never find ‘pure’ technical or ‘pure’ social factors. We 
should therefore look at these processes and technologies as hybrid ‘sociotechnical 
combinations’ (Latour 1993).  
In actor-network theory (ANT), one of the liveliest theoretical traditions within 
the academic field of science and technology studies (STS), the ambition is to dissolve, 
or at least be agnostic to, the separation between technical and social aspects. Therefore, 
ANT studies sociotechnical combinations in the making, addressing social and technical 
factors as entangled in a development process where no one has priority (Callon 2009). 
What is usually called technological innovation also includes innovation of identities, 
social roles, decision making processes, and institutions that are adapted to the 
technological object. What goes on in such an innovation process is mutual adaptation 
between many factors gathered together in one and the same process. But why is it so 
difficult to overcome the urge for separation, just as much for social scientists studying 
participatory processes, as it is for scientists and engineers discussing ‘their’ 
technological projects in public? 
Latour (1993) attributes this need for separation to modernization and the 
tendency for specialization in modern societies, a reasoning we also find with authors 
stressing the functional differentiation of society and the subsequent difficulty of 
communication between different social systems (Luhmann 1982). However, Latour 
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argues that in spite of this tendency for separation, it is often difficult to achieve in 
practice, because things tend to be more blurred, resulting almost inevitably in various 
degrees of integration (Latour 1993). When studying entangled sociotechnical 
combinations it is therefore useful to distinguish between separation and integration as 
two framings that inform the approaches taken by actors.  
From the perspective of separation the issue at stake is framed and treated as if 
there is a clear boundary between social and technical factors. According to Latour 
separation is a means of simplification, of trying to get a grip on a complex and 
intertwined reality (Latour 1993). From this perspective, the kind of accepted 
involvement of non-experts in decision making on ‘technical’ issues is after the fact, 
instrumental and about increasing legitimacy and creating trust. This frame constructs a 
situation where an apparently ‘ready-made’ technology is to be implemented. Conflicts 
and negative attitudes around technological projects, framed as ‘pure’ technical 
activities, are understood as part of the context and identified as something outside of 
the project. This does not mean that so-called social aspects are considered less 
important or ignored, but they are seen as less manageable: such social factors are 
typically framed as external obstacles or barriers that can block technical activities for a 
long time and even terminate them (Kos 1999).  
It is worth noting that separation as a frame is also found among ‘social’ actors, 
such as politicians and citizens, and, as argued above, among social scientists studying 
the participatory turn in connection to controversial technology. These usually focus on 
social factors, such as participation, legitimacy and decision making. From the 
perspective of STS, and not least ANT, a separation framing is never telling the full 
story while it hides the necessary existing connections always taking place between 
divided actors and activities, designated as being distinctly ‘technical’ or ‘social’: there 
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is no separation without integration. Nevertheless, as already noted, separation is a 
common strategy used by actors in a modern society in order to present their activities 
as having clear boundaries and as being independent of extraneous influences. 
The frame of integration presents the social and technical aspects as being co-
produced, i.e. that they are shaping each other through an interdependent process. Such 
co-production means that social aspects influence technical projects, while a technical 
project simultaneously supports and justifies the corresponding social project. 
Developing a technical project also means shaping society (Bijker and Law 1992; 
Callon and Law 1982; Jasanoff 2004). This framing means, therefore, that the actors 
involved do not behave as if they belong to two distinct spheres or phases. Technical 
experts are part of a social project, that influences their work, and political 
representatives, environmental organisations and citizens make claims that are not only 
emotional or socioeconomic, but based on technical details as well as opinions on what 
the technical project is all about. Within this integrative type of combination, lay 
knowledge is neither treated as being of secondary interest nor does it stand apart from 
technical knowledge production. Thus what had been framed as ‘context’ is reframed as 
‘content’ (Wynne 2003, 410). 
Latour and others argue that entanglement is what happens in practice. Both 
separation and integration are ways of responding to this entanglement. As a 
consequence we see hybrid forms of governance systems emerging, using different 
ways of dealing with entanglements – recognising them, dividing and sorting them out – 
in order to find a solution to the problem of governing controversial technology. 
Separation may not even be intrinsically problematic if there is acknowledgement that it 
is a simplification and awareness of the more complex entanglements existing behind it. 
On the other hand, for integration to be more than a rhetorical framing by powerful 
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actors aiming to achieve legitimacy, it must allow lay people’s contribution to be as 
much about framing the issue as about, for example, enriching expert knowledge. From 
an STS perspective, therefore, it is of great importance to examine not only the frames 
that are employed but also to how these are enacted, investigating how, if integration is 
claimed, actors are recognising this or, if integration is not claimed, how activities are 
presented as being of a separated kind.   
In the following two sections we will address in more detail how social aspects 
are framed and understood, and how they are related to the technical aspects in national 
activities dealing with radioactive waste, by examining approaches to governance in 
Belgium, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and the ways in which 
participation and the prevalent sociotechnical divide figure in these approaches. 
In doing this we will use the notions of separation and integration as two 
different ways of framing the complex and entangled relationships between the 
technical and the social. We will follow in the footsteps of the actors in the four 
countries to see how they deal with the relationship,  to see the specific configurations 
that result, and to explore the variations in how these sociotechnical combinations are 
constructed, understood and presented. 
Sociotechnical combinations: four national examples 
After the failure of a technocratic top-down approach, which happened at different 
times in the four countries described below, it looked as if consensus emerged around 
the shortcomings of a technically-driven siting process. Both implementers and opinion 
groups apparently agreed that the agencies responsible had been focused only on 
technical issues and had not paid enough attention to social aspects. Therefore, 
programmes were reset on a new ‘participatory’ basis, with due attention paid to 
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societal interests and concerns and, by implication at least, with the possibility that 
technical criteria could be adapted in some way to social factors. In the following 
description we focus on how and when shifts to more participatory approaches occurred 
in Belgium, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. We consider these shifts as 
formative periods and therefore do not give full historical descriptions of RWM in the 
four countries. Instead we explore how social aspects are incorporated in these 
‘technical’ programmes understood in new ways, and analyse the sociotechnical 
combinations configured through these shifts and formative periods. In this we focus on 
specific mechanisms developed for dealing with the entanglement of the social and the 
technical.  
Before describing these four cases, it would be appropriate to outline the reasons that 
they were chosen as the focus of the research and of the analysis presented here. Firstly, 
there was what we might call a criterion of similarity: all of these countries shared the 
essential characteristic of having seen a marked participatory turn in radioactive waste 
management policy, developing an approach to siting that gave communities a voice in 
the process but that also came to focus on communities hosting existing nuclear 
facilities. Secondly, a criterion of diversity: in each country there were significant 
differences in the national context, in the way that participation took place and in the 
ways that the prevalent divide between the treatment of the social and the technical was 
dealt with. The process in each of these countries has also at some time been viewed 
from outside as being in some respect exemplary. The additional fact that they have all 
participated in several European research projects on radioactive waste and societal 
governance issues also signals a sustained interest in the social aspects of nuclear waste 
among waste management agencies, engaged community stakeholders and social 
scientists in each of these countries. Taking all of these characteristics into account, 
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these four countries represent particularly rich cases through which to explore the 
production of and variation in sociotechnical configurations. 
Turning now to our cases, we start in Sweden, where the shift from technocracy to a 
more inclusive strategy in radioactive waste management first took place. 
Sweden 
Based on the key word of voluntarism, the new mechanism for integrating social and 
technical issues launched in 1992 by Sweden’s RWM company, the Swedish Fuel and 
Waste Management Company – SKB, soon turned into a success (Sundqvist 2002; 
Elam and Sundqvist 2007). This mechanism was called ‘feasibility studies’ and by a 
stepwise process municipalities were invited to define themselves, on a voluntary basis, 
as possible stakeholders in the process of siting spent nuclear fuel. The SKB strategy 
made clear that social factors were of interest to the municipalities and that they had to 
decide about these by themselves, independently of SKB and the technical knowledge 
of the company. The municipalities should decide on their own whether to take part in a 
feasibility study, and after the completion of the study once again decide whether or not 
to continue with more detailed studies of bedrock conditions. This meant a clear 
division of labour between SKB and the municipality, and also a separation between 
technical and social issues. While municipalities discuss social factors – such as 
possible socioeconomic benefits and risks for achieving a social stigma – SKB 
evaluates technical facts and the geological potential of the municipality. Both SKB and 
the municipalities appear to be of the opinion that guaranteeing safety is not something 
to be left to local politicians or ordinary citizens, and therefore they should not be 
expected to offer opinions about bedrock conditions and long-term safety (Elam and 
Sundqvist 2007). 
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During the period of nine years (1992-2001) feasibility studies were conducted 
in eight municipalities leading to a selection of two sites, Oskarshamn and Östhammar, 
for more detailed investigations including extended bedrock drillings. These later 
studies were ended in 2007 and in March 2011 SKB applied to the government 
authorities for permission to start construction work for a final repository of spent 
nuclear fuel in the municipality of Östhammar, 150 km northeast of Stockholm, which 
already hosts three nuclear reactors and the final repository for low- and intermediate 
radioactive waste. The new voluntary approach launched in 1992 has positioned SKB in 
a world-leading situation of having municipalities competing for hosting a repository 
for spent nuclear fuel and finally selecting one of these as the final site.  
Slovenia 
A new start of the siting process in Slovenia began in 1996 when a so-called ‘mixed 
mode’ site selection process was set up by the public waste agency, ARAO – Agency 
for Radioactive Waste Management. This process concerned site selection and planning 
of a repository for low and intermediate level waste.3 The mixed mode approach gives 
local municipalities a clear and crucial role in the siting process (Polič, Kos, and 
Železnik 2013) . On the other hand, participation is not about being involved in 
technical work, but about being informed on these activities and reacting to what is 
presented by the experts. This approach is similar to the Swedish feasibility studies and 
                                                 
3 At the time – and even today – the repository for HLW was not yet considered. There are 
governmental documents dealing with this problem but no real activities. The reason for 
this is that national disposal of the relatively small quantity of HLW produced in Slovenia 
is not considered rational. This attitude could be summarized as: HLW is “too big a 
problem to fail”, while Slovenian HLW production is “too small to act”. 
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means a separation of technical and social issues, where local participation is about 
accepting or rejecting ready-made technology.  
After some rounds of negotiations between municipalities, responding to a siting 
bid, and ARAO, the number of potential hosts shrank from ten to three. Later only two 
localities remained in the game – two municipalities which for more than twenty years 
have been hosting Slovenia’s only nuclear power plant.4 In these municipalities local 
partnerships were established, initially designed following the Belgian example (see 
below), which added a mechanism for organizing actors in relation to the mixed mode 
approach. The purpose of this participative institutional framework was to enable 
integral, integrated and equal dialogue between all involved groups. Local partnerships 
were evidently designed to re-establish trust and communication between interest 
groups with particular regard to bringing closer social and technical views on the 
repository. But as evaluation of the established local partnerships confirmed, the 
intended integration of the social and the technical failed (Korže, Plut, and Jesenšek 
2008). The new attempt to work towards an integral sociotechnical solution was very 
much ‘path dependent’, i.e. driven by a historical socio-political legacy. Therefore, the 
local partnership did not eliminate the competition to control discourse on the nuclear 
repository. Dichotomies like social versus technical experts, politics versus civil society 
institutions (NGO), local versus national interest groups persisted, with informal 
political networks linking local and national actors playing a very important in the 
outcome. The complex structure of the local partnership was in fact harming 
deliberation, because it was fully controlled by local political professionals. As a 
                                                 
4 The nuclear power plant is located in Krško municipality but very close to the border of 
Brežice, and in practice both are considered as ‘nuclear’ municipalities.   
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consequence some of the most affected groups were marginalised. Moreover, the 
compensation anticipated for the local community hosting the repository gave rise to 
new tensions. A substantial part of the lay public remained uninformed, while technical 
experts remained largely unmoved by the attempt to reframe radioactive waste as a 
sociotechnical issue. As soon as the location for the repository was formally selected, 
the partnership in Krško was shut down and the idea that lay groups are not competent 
to participate in the decision making process revived (Kos, Polič and Železnik 2011) 
The final outcome of the Slovenian partnership was thus a not-particularly-harmonious 
or trusting relationship between affected actors, one that did not break out of the frame 
of a strong social and technical divide.  
Belgium 
In the late 1990s the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile 
Materials (ONDRAF/NIRAS) changed its approach and invited potential host communities 
to set up ‘local partnerships’, bringing together local politicians and representatives from 
the local civil society in order to investigate and consider the technical and social 
feasibility of implementing a repository facility for low and intermediate level, short-
lived waste (LILW) in their municipality (Bergmans, Van Steenberge and Verjans 2006; 
Bergmans 2008; Bergmans and Barbier 2012). Three such partnerships were created, 
involving four municipalities.  
All three partnerships developed, together with ONDRAF/NIRAS, an integrated 
concept for a repository project, encompassing societal preconditions (related to social 
as well as technical aspects), and advised their municipal councils positively on the 
feasibility question. Two municipalities, Dessel and Mol, subsequently decided to put 
themselves forward as potential host communities. In 2006 the Belgian federal 
government choose the site in Dessel, and acknowledged that the partnership approach 
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should continue during the further elaboration and implementation of the repository 
project, as well as during its operation. Given that the other candidate site, Mol, is a 
neighbour to Dessel, both partnerships (STORA in Dessel and MONA in Mol) stay 
involved in the further development of the repository project (Bergmans and Barbier 
2012).  
In the preparatory phase, the RWM agency worked together with its local 
partners within one partnership, thus giving the local actors a firm hand in the agenda 
setting and a voice in the definition of both problem and solution (Bergmans 2008). The 
partnership was the carrier of all kinds of investigations and proposals, developing as 
well as assessing results. It was the sole forum for negotiations and decision making, 
bearing in mind that the municipal council and the government at a later stage were to 
decide on the issue. However, within this strong focus on integration we also find 
examples of separation. This has for example been present in the veto ONDRAF/NIRAS 
insisted on with regard to the technical feasibility of any design proposals made by the 
community partners. Another example is the role of the regulatory body, FANC, which 
refused to take part in the initial discussions on the repository design, to safeguard its 
‘objectivity’ in making a technical judgement on the safety of the facility, when a 
licence application would be submitted (Bergmans, Van Steenberge and Verjans 2006).  
During the following phase of development (including the preparation of a licence 
application) and implementation, a triangular relation has come about between a locally 
embedded ONDRAF/NIRAS project team and the two partnerships as ‘watchdogs’, with 
the initiative and agenda setting back in the hands of the RWM agency, relying on its 
legal responsibility and obligation as care taker of the waste (Bergmans and Barbier 
2012).  




In 2001, following the failure of earlier siting programmes, the UK Government 
launched a new programme, Managing Radioactive Waste Safely (MRWS), with the 
aim of developing a strategy for intermediate and high-level wastes that would not only 
be technically sound but would also command public confidence and therefore be 
implementable. Central to MRWS therefore was a commitment to involve as wide a 
range of stakeholders as possible from an early stage of the process. A new advisory 
body, the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM), was established in 
2003 and initially mandated to review the options for the long-term management of 
radioactive waste and to make recommendations to Government on the best option, or 
combination of options. The Committee decided to consider the entire range of potential 
technical options, including those that had earlier been ruled out by a number of 
authoritative bodies. In addition to this open approach to technical options CoRWM 
also explored a range of social and ethical considerations associated with these options 
(Butler and Simmons 2013). It also notably involved a much greater degree of 
engagement with stakeholders and the public, in relation to both technical and social 
aspects of the problem, than any comparable consultation process. Importantly, for its 
evaluation of short-listed options CoRWM conducted what it described as a holistic 
evaluation, an extended deliberative process with input from stakeholders and citizens, 
the results of which were compared with those of a formalised multi-criteria decision 
analysis (MCDA):  
An holistic assessment enabled a more discursive and intuitive approach where 
ethical, scientific and public forms of knowledge could be brought together in 
reaching conclusions. Overall, it was CoRWM’s task to integrate the variety of 
knowledge streams in making its final recommendations. The 
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recommendations, then, are not simply an expression of expert knowledge and 
judgement. (CoRWM 2006: 6-7) 
In its report to Government CoRWM recommended geological disposal as the technical 
endpoint for long-term radioactive waste management but with the proviso that research 
and development (R&D) continue with the aim of reducing the uncertainties 
surrounding geological disposal – and that national and international R&D should be 
monitored with a view to identifying alternative management options (CoRWM 2006). 
This was combined with the recommendation that a staged, voluntary approach should 
be taken to siting, with a benefits package for potential host communities and a right of 
withdrawal up until the final stage of the process. CoRWM’s options appraisal process 
combined the simplification of formalised MCDA with the identification and discussion 
of technical, social and ethical complexities during the holistic process. By not drawing 
a strong boundary between social and technical aspects of the issue and by building 
both into its recommendations, it could therefore be seen as an integrative 
sociotechnical combination.5  
                                                 
5 Unlike the other cases discussed, the stages of the UK’s MRWS process outlined here focused 
on policy formulation rather than site selection. Subsequent steps in a process of voluntary 
site identification resulted in an expression of interest by three local councils in West 
Cumbria. A local partnership of elected councils and various stakeholder groups was 
formed in March 2009 to investigate and advise on the implications of entering the 
process. Reflecting the strategy of integration, it consulted extensively and considered the 
views and evidence both of local citizens and stakeholder groups and of independent 
experts on technical and socioeconomic aspects of the proposal. Although the decision in 
January 2013 by the Cabinet of Cumbria County Council not to proceed brought the 
process to a halt, Government subsequently reopened the volunteering process with the 
publication of a revised implementation framework. However, the consequences for the 
configuration of a sociotechnical combination based on integration are yet to be seen.  
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Sociotechnical combinations: four critical issues 
Thus far we have seen that approaches in Slovenia and Sweden are based on maintain 
separation between social and technical factors, while in Belgium and the United 
Kingdom examples of integration could be found. The picture is more complex, 
however, and before drawing final conclusions we need to elaborate further on the ways 
in which activities in these four countries enacted the relationship between social and 
technical aspects. Four issues and their associated problems seemed to be critical. The 
first two are most relevant to situations where the sociotechnical combinations are 
framed and understood in terms of a strong divide between social and technical factors, 
while the last two relate to more integrative examples. These four issues complicate the 
two framings of separation and integration, but showing that these complexities are of 
importance in our four nations contributes to a more nuanced understanding on how 
actors are dealing with the social and the technical in the creation of sociotechnical 
combinations. 
Concealment of social aspects  
One implication of separation may be that technical agencies embed social 
commitments within technical choices in a non-transparent way. In Slovenia and 
Sweden municipalities, as part of the process of finding a solution to the waste problem, 
were given the right to accept or reject proposals from the waste agencies. However, in 
neither case did this lead to a broad discussion of technical issues. It was just about 
accepting or rejecting proposals from ARAO and SKB. SKB has strategically 
reassessed its view on safety issues and geological bedrock conditions, shifting from a 
focus on finding the best possible site to identifying a suitable or ‘good enough’ site 
(Sundqvist 2002: ch. 5). The same shift was observable in the Slovenian siting 
procedure. This illustrates the technical actors were trying to adapt to the social aspects 
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of the problem. This adaptation (some would call it a downplaying) of the bedrock 
criterion to what is socially achievable is not a pure scientific matter. In Sweden, this 
strategic choice was made solely by SKB. In Slovenia the choice of the mixed mode 
approach, including a first rough technical screening that also involved assessing and 
deciding on social issues, was proposed and conducted by ARAO without including 
municipality representatives and citizens in the process. Why choose such a strategy? 
What was the motivation behind it? How could a method for ranking potential locations 
be developed? These questions are not purely scientific, but also very much about what 
is achievable in a society where, in most communities, radioactive waste is considered 
an unwanted product which is to be shunned. Where separation is the existing mode of 
operation, these strategic questions tend to be concealed within what are presented as 
technical issues and therefore decided by technical experts alone. This is an important 
consequence of activities framed and presented as being based on a strong social and 
technical divide. 
Our first complexity shows a sociotechnical combination in which the social 
aspects are concealed by a project presenting itself as being more technical than it is. 
Subordinating social aspects  
One thing that seems hard to avoid is that social aspects are made to take a lower 
priority, and considered as something to add, at a later stage, to already well developed 
and defined technical projects. This has been called ‘downstream’ engagement, i.e. 
adding social flavour to existing and stable technological programmes (Stirling 2005; 
Wilsdon and Willis 2004). One reason for this to happen is that the technology is 
mature; technological R&D programmes had already been established back in the 1950s 
and geological disposal has been the main reference option since it was judged in 1957 
 Final pre-proof version - to be published in Journal of Risk Research 
DOI: 10.1080/13669877.2014.971335 
23
by the US National Academy of Sciences to be the safest method for disposal of high 
level wastes (NAS 1957). At that time ‘the waste problem’, including making social 
choices and formulating social strategies, was delegated to technical experts. When, 
much later, public consultations were held in various countries, giving the impression 
that all options remained open for discussion, it was forgotten that many actors long ago 
had made up their minds on important and strategic issues such as technical options 
(choosing geological disposal) and best possible sites. All too often these basic 
assumptions and strategic choices have remained unchanged over time, leading to social 
aspects being stripped of strategic substance, and consultations being narrowed to 
giving support, acceptance and legitimacy to old sociotechnical combinations disguised 
as purely technical solutions. 
This second complexity shows a sociotechnical combination that gives priority 
to the configurations produced by experts, while downplaying possible new 
contributions from ‘social’ actors in a later stage.  
Fragmented and incremental process (isolated integration) 
Integrative initiatives are often set up as a response to crises and when these are 
overcome things tend to go back to business as usual, with technical experts advising 
government decision-makers. In both Belgium and Slovenia partnerships were 
established, but only in relation to short-lived waste. Spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
waste have not yet been part of any kind of integrative initiative, although in Belgium 
some very preliminary steps have been taken. Moreover, in Slovenia the focus is on 
siting, while technological options are not really discussed with involved municipalities. 
It is indicative in this respect that the partnership established in Krško was terminated 
immediately after the site was officially confirmed by the local community and by the 




Another example of what could be called ‘isolated integration’ is the possibility 
for a strong decision maker to independently decide in a way that does not rely on what 
has been achieved by earlier integrative initiatives. The decision taken by the Belgian 
Government in June 2006, choosing surface disposal in Dessel as the preferred option, 
was largely based on the partnership reports and municipal decisions, but also added 
new elements (such as criteria on the size of the proposed terrain), raised by the waste 
manager’s director general in a confidential note to government and not agreed up front 
within the partnership process (Bergmans 2006). 
In Sweden, the decision to choose Östhammar as the preferred site was taken 
independently by SKB and did not include the two municipalities being considered, 
despite them having been involved in consultation processes for many years as part of 
feasibility studies and site investigations. In the UK the context has changed somewhat 
since the MRWS process was initiated and CoRWM began its deliberations. The 
timetable for the closure of existing nuclear power stations, Government demands for 
acceleration of the national programme of site decommissioning, the inclusion of new 
nuclear build in UK energy policy, and the policy of economic austerity that has 
resulted in widespread cuts in public expenditure all put pressure on MRWS and, 
specifically, on the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s Radioactive Waste 
Management Division to speed up the process (see, e.g. NDA 2011). Given the arrested 
progress with finding a volunteer community, it is nevertheless too early to evaluate 
whether these pressures will result in the MRWS process becoming isolated within a 
stronger technically-driven framing advanced by parties wanting to realise geological 
disposal as soon as possible, and preferably close to existing facilities.  
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This third complexity shows a sociotechnical combination that is not well 
connected to other combinations important to its existence and the way it is framed. 
Integration disguising separation 
The motivation to initiate integration activities such as partnerships is often based on the 
aim of restoring public credibility for scientific and technological projects. 
Nevertheless, despite rhetoric that promises collaboration among equals, old boundaries 
between technical and social aspects are often protected. It is reasonable to assume, 
from contacts with the expert community, that in the case of the Belgium partnerships 
many technical experts started out with that mindset. But whilst the position of 
ONDRAF/NIRAS remained privileged, being viewed as the architect of the facility and the 
one that has answers to technical questions due to its strong technical competence, the 
local participants did keep a critical eye on it. They challenged claims made, looked for 
second opinions, or asked for complementary, independently-conducted research. They 
even asked for technical changes in the repository design, due to their different 
appreciation of what constitutes safety. But whilst the local community and the waste 
manager agreed on a new sociotechnical combination, the regulator, who had remained 
out of the discussions to protect its independence, subsequently based its initial safety 
assessment purely on existing criteria, ignoring the new elements proposed by 
concerned citizens as being essential for safety, elements more based on controllability 
and the possibility for active intervention. In Slovenia ARAO maintains its position as 
manager of the process but the decree of compensation made it more attractive for 
municipalities to join what was described as a common partnership. The Slovenian case 
clearly demonstrates that there is always a risk that ‘partnership’ becomes a new label 
for an old division of labour, where technical agencies are not only strong in relation to 
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their technical competence but also protect fundamental strategic sociotechnical choices 
as their own business.  
This fourth complexity shows a sociotechnical combination that is presented as 
integration but still maintains partial or virtually complete separation in practice. 
Conclusions  
We began by questioning the notion, often taken for granted in RWM, as in the 
governance of controversial technology more generally, of a self-evident distinction and 
consequent divide in practice between social and technical aspects of the situation. 
Instead we proposed a view of the relationship between social and technical that is more 
interactive and entangled. We further problematised the way in which the relationship 
between the social and the technical is enacted in RWM, exploring this relationship in 
terms of their relative integration or separation in four national cases, identifying 
different configurations of integration and separation within the resulting sociotechnical 
combinations produced in each of the four different contexts, and reflecting upon the 
critical issues raised by each. In this final section we conclude by reflecting upon some 
of the implications and potential applications to which the perspective outlined here 
gives rise. 
A first, analytical implication is that in order to achieve a better understanding of 
the entanglements of the social and the technical and to foster greater transparency in 
the field of radioactive waste management we should be prepared to acknowledge the 
complexity in their performances. Although focusing on such complexities undoubtedly 
creates new challenges, we would argue that it is essential to do so when faced with a 
technology which may well be in the process of shaping, in significant measure, our 
collective future. We offer the concept of sociotechnical combinations and their variable 
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and complex configurations as one theoretical tool with which this complexity can be 
analysed and better understood. 
Many national RWM programmes are now focused on implementing geological 
disposal of long-lived higher-activity wastes. In most countries where this is the case 
the disposal technology was determined long before any participatory turn, although in 
many countries the specific site, type of host rock and detailed design characteristics are 
still the subject of investigation. We should therefore first acknowledge that the 
existence of this prior framing of the solution to long-term RWM and the associated 
commitments in terms of legislative frameworks, research and development 
programmes, and expertise ‘closes down’ the problem (Stirling 2005) and limits the 
scope for formal citizen participation to influence the resulting sociotechnical 
configuration. The response of citizens to such commitments in many countries has 
been, as already noted, informal participatory activity expressed in controversy and 
conflict. However, even where the choice of disposal option is (re)opened to formal 
public deliberation, as it was in UK case outlined above, it does not necessarily lead to 
the changed configuration, for example around some form of long-term storage 
technology and associated institutions and cultural practices of stewardship, that 
opponents of geological disposal desire to see. 
Nevertheless, even where geological disposal has been confirmed as the disposal 
technology of choice, sustained participation can constitute a hybrid forum (Callon and 
Rip 1992), within which the combined sociotechnical nature of issues such as long-term 
safety can be recognised and the issue opened up, deliberated and potentially re-
problematised (Barthe 2009) in order to work towards sociotechnical combinations - 
that is, configurations of actions, interactions and practices - that better reflect and 
integrate the concerns of affected citizens. Such combinations will of course be 
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contingent and, as noted by Rip (2010), precarious; they will also likely present, as did 
our examples above, critical issues that will need to be addressed; all of which is an 
argument for fostering an awareness of the entangled nature of the issues and its 
consequences in order that the risk of lock-in or of some unintended and inflexible form 
of path dependency is reduced. This is not then a simple or a simplistic recipe; in fact 
not a recipe at all but a theoretically-based, empirically-grounded proposal for an 
approach to the task of developing what has been referred to as technical democracy 
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